Mulcair’s behind the NDP rise

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Photo credit: Etienne Ranger, Le Droit)



 Alex Marland

Alex Marland (Memorial University) has published about political marketing in the Journal of Public Affairs, political talk radio in Media, Culture and Society, and about Newfoundland nationalism in the International Journal of Canadian Studies.

Ever think about how much goes on in your mind before before you buy something for the first time? You need to hear about it, you need to have a problem that needs solving, you need to prioritize one option over others, you need to make a decision, and once you’ve made a purchase you assess the quality of the product/service while you are using it. Marketers know this and use models of cognition theory and behavioural decisions to figure out how to get you to buy their product.

The same thing happens in politics. And currently commentators seem to be attributing the NDP’s stunning rise in Quebec to Jack Layton. I get this: Layton scores well in leadership polls, did well in the French debate, and was even born and raised in Quebec. But someone else is very much responsible.

Thomas Mulcair.

From a marketing perspective, the party’s lone Quebec MP deserves much of the credit for many Quebeckers currently toying with the idea of voting NDP. This is because he softened the ground as the marketing equivalent of a ‘product trial’. For years, Quebeckers have heard about the NDP, but it wasn’t seen to be able to solve their needs. They had no reason to prioritize it over other parties, and so voting NDP wasn’t a serious consideration.

Since winning a 2007 by-election, Mulcair has been the party’s regional salesman in Quebec, a position augmented by his role as a deputy NDP leader. He has represented Outremont capably and offers Quebec a credible voice in Parliament. A CROP poll in early April predicted he would comfortably hold off a challenge from former Liberal Justice Minister Martin Cauchon – and that was before the New Democratic Party’s province-wide rise.

In other words, Mulcair’s presence means that for the past few years more Quebeckers have been slowly evaluating the NDP, whether they knew it or not. When a number of them recently sensed that voting for other parties, notably the Bloc Québécois, would not fulfill their needs, the combination of Layton and Mulcair meant that the NDP emerged as a better option. Or at least one worth considering.

For all that, I wonder whether this dalliance will materialize on Election Day. Thierry Giasson is also hesitant, comparing the situation to Quebeckers considering a pricy cashmere sweater, who may not go through with the sale. One of my hesitations? Throughout the campaign I have been reading about too many phantom NDP candidates in Quebec. They do not have a sufficient local presence to turn survey intentions into quite the same proportion of hard votes. The Liberal party is mentioning as much in its "Not so fast, Jack" advertising.

Still, just as some Canadians are now looking at how the parties are using marketing techniques such as micro-targeting, we can use a marketing way of thinking to make a case for the NDP to give Thomas Mulcair a big pat on the back.

After May 2, of course.

Stephen Harper’s been pinned

 
Photo source: www.zimbio.com/Stephen+Harper/articles/14/Stephen+Harper+Wins+Election+Refuses+Wear

 

Alex Marland

Alex Marland (Memorial University) has published about political marketing in the Journal of Public Affairs, political talk radio in Media, Culture and Society, and about Newfoundland nationalism in the International Journal of Canadian Studies.

Pierre Trudeau famously sported a rose in his lapel. Sometimes politicians wear political ribbons. Women often wear broaches. Stephen Harper? He wears a Canadian flag pin. Look closely: it’s there. You probably didn’t notice it before, but you will now. The book cover of Harperland is a good example.

What does this little piece of metal symbolize? The Harper brand. At least, the brand of Harper that his handlers are trying to convey. Specifically, that Stephen Harper is a patriotic Canadian. His flag pin is a subtle reminder that only he stands up for Canadian values. Or, at least, the version of Canadian values that the Harper Conservatives value.

Here are some of the many ways that the Conservatives try to position the party and their leader as defenders of the Canadian way of life:

• Stephen Harper is regularly surrounded by Canadian flags. Jean Chrétien was a pro at this. The flag is now so entwined in Conservative images that they appear to be on a mission to edge out the Liberal party' brand as the foremost choice for national unity;
• Conservative policies support the Canadian military and thereby 'support the troops' and they feature a defence of Canadian sovereignty including the Arctic;
• Harper spends time at Tim Hortons coffee shops, a business whose own marketing has branded itself with Canadian identity;
• He hangs out at Canadian sporting events such as curling, the Calgary Stampede, CFL games and of course hockey and the Vancouver Olympics;
• His ties often include the colour red and during the campaign Harper has been wearing a jacket emblazoned with “CANADA”; and,
• The Conservative party campaign slogan is strategically titled, "Here For Canada", their platform document features a Canadian flag, and their newest TV ads are full of Canadian iconography.

This nationalist positioning is really only a Conservative party strength if it is a corresponding weakness for the Liberal party. So Conservative advertising positions Harper’s main adversary as someone who ‘came back’ and is ‘just visiting’. In contrast, Harper quietly works at his office desk with the Canadian flag positioned behind him. His handlers have used flags for a long time, but not the flag pin. It wasn’t there in the 2005-06 campaign; that’s when promoting his young family was a good way to contrast with an older Paul Martin. But the Harper flag pin was prominent during the 2008 coalition crisis when he was defending national unity, for instance.

Sure, nationalism is prevalent in all elections, and not just in Canada. Flags are the most common way to convey this. They are present at protests, at leaders’ summits and at sporting events. Different ones are used depending on the audience, especially where Quebec's concerned. In Newfoundland, where I’m writing from, there are people who do not vote who have branded themselves with a tattoo of the Newfoundland independence flag which symbolizes their political identity. Flag tattoos are common elsewhere too. Maybe our PM even has one.

I would say he does – it just happens to be a highly symbolic piece of metal on his lapel.

(Incidentally NDP advertising is noticeably wrapping Jack Layton in the Canadian flag. So does the Bloc Quebecois with Gilles Duceppe... just a flag with slightly different symbolism)

TypePad Conversations » Answer this question!

Why Stephen kisses Laureen

 
(Photo credit: Chris Wattie, Reuters. Source: http://www.vancouversun.com/news/thewest/Harper+goes+Bollywood/4585024/story.html)

Alex Marland

Alex Marland (Memorial University) has published about political marketing in the Journal of Public Affairs, political talk radio in Media, Culture and Society, and about Newfoundland nationalism in the International Journal of Canadian Studies.

Did you see Laureen Harper’s Bollywood dance? Have you noticed that from the outset of the campaign that Stephen and Laureen Harper have been spending a lot of time together publicly? That she is present at photo ops? That they often kiss publicly?

There is more to this than celebrity-style gossip. Commenting on Mrs. Harper’s presence does not mean entering the private lives of our politicians, which tends to be out of bounds in Canadian political discourse. No, there is something strategic at play here, and it’s nothing sinister. Rather, Conservative strategists have put their fingers on something that works.

Like many leaders Stephen Harper has long had an image problem. He has lots of strengths, but shoring up his weaknesses is the job of image managers, who will tell you that you can only package the product you have. In other words, you have to work with what you’ve got.

In Mr. Harper’s case his wife seems to be the ying to his yang insofar as public images are concerned. He is cold, she is warm; he is aloof, she is outgoing; he is media-shy, she is media-friendly; he is partisan, she is apolitical. Including Mrs. Harper in photo-ops nicely addresses so many needs:

• she is photogenic and so refreshingly human in such a scripted bubble-like media environment;
• she likely resonates with female voters, whom have long been an Achilles heel of Stephen Harper and the conservative/individualistic ideology generally;
• unlike her husband, she probably does not generate anger among any segments of the electorate, even those who are fearful of a Conservative majority government;
• she has fans among Liberal and NDP politicos (maybe Bloc too, but I can’t be sure);
• she is widely liked amongst the press corps, whom have had an antagonistic relationship with her husband;
• she projects a First Lady status, which makes Stephen Harper seem more presidential, but does so in a Michelle Obama way rather than a Mila Mulroney manner;
• she plays well with the Conservative party faithful, especially when the Harpers’ children are included in photo-ops which communicates that compared with the other party leaders only they represent family values and concerns;
• she is a sharp contrast to Michael Ignatieff’s wife, Zsuzsanna Zsohar, whose presence could potentially add to Mr. Ignatieff’s image weaknesses of elitism and of ‘just visiting’ Canada; and
• Laureen Harper is a subtle reminder to Canadians concerned about Stephen Harper’s concentration of power that, like Aline Chrétien was with Jean Chrétien, she is likely a sharp political mind who is a good sounding board for the prime minister.

All of this is related to something called celebrity transfer. That is, when a celebrity endorses someone or something, the recipient becomes associated with the characteristics of that celebrity. It’s why athletes and Hollywood types are paid big bucks to endorse products – we think the products are better and thus are more likely to buy them. And it’s why politicians fall over opportunities to hobnob with celebrities. Think Paul Martin and Bono.

Laureen Harper has pep. The media seem to love her. She is a marketer’s dream. And in a world where personality politics often trumps policy, the Conservatives are rightly engaging one of their biggest assets in this campaign.

(Note: Perhaps a case could be made for Jack Layton and Olivia Chow, but it is my impression that they are not campaigning together the way that they did in past campaigns)

The silence of the lambs, er, candidates

The political parties have had me thinking of McLobster lately. I'll come back to that oddity in a moment.

I am intrigued by the Conservatives' announcement, less than a week into the campaign, that the leader’s tour will no longer be answering questions about local candidates. This comes after negative information (known as ‘oppo’ in the business) was disclosed by parties about candidates running to become a Member of Parliament. Sometimes this seems to have been timed with the movements of a leader's tour. When a leader arrives in an area of the country, the party's messaging is destabilized by having to deal with a localized controversy. It's a smart tactic, no?

Unfortunately this is another nail in the coffin for the ability of major parties to recruit and encourage independent thinkers. The parties already expect that their candidates will be salespeople repeating key messages, will use campaign materials such as lawn signs whose ‘look and feel’ is designed by the party centre, and that they will avail of party-controlled technologies such as telemarketing and Web site design. Aside from saying a quick hello on a doorstep there's increasingly little that the average candidate is allowed to do.

(Quick aside: I am currently monitoring the electioneering of local candidates across Canada. If anyone has noticed any unusual forms of campaigning in their area, from lawn signs to technology, please do take a moment to leave a comment)

To some, the lack of candidate independence is distressing. It is bad enough that MPs are muzzled in the House of Commons, and vote on party lines like sheep, but surely an election is the embodiment of free speech, a discussion of ideas and, ultimately, a barometer of the health of a democracy.

I think that candidates, electoral district associations, party members and local campaign workers had better get used to this reality. In a 24/7 media environment political opponents and bored journalists can quickly jump on the slightest hint of controversy. There are too many risks associated with candidates issuing news releases, participating in all-candidate debates, updating Facebook profiles and publicly musing on Twitter. With every disruption, with every controversy, the party centre gains a reason to encroach upon candidates' freedom of speech. Given that research shows that the party leader and the party label hold by far the most sway in vote decisions, and the local candidate is largely an afterthought for electors, muzzling candidates is in the best interests of the party to perform well in a democratic election. It's not how the system was designed, but the reality is that candidates are merely salespeople of the product, and not the product itself.

Which brings me to the McLobster. If you look at political parties and their candidates as franchisers and franchisees, somewhat like UBC's R.K. Carty has, then you will appreciate how imperative it is for local representatives of a national operation to be singing the same tune. McDonald's Canada, for instance, controls its restaurant franchisees' product, pricing, place and promotional decisions. If one of its restaurants is notoriously dirty, has terrible service or offers special side deals, this weakens the overall brand and has negative repercussions for McDonald's Canada and for its other restaurants. It is up to the national company to ensure quality control which has been one of the keys to its success. A significant variation is the flexibility to respond to local markets, such as offering the McLobster on the East coast. In the same way the parties practice some limited regional variation in public policy to suit the tastes of the local electorate.

But whether it is a national political party or a national restaurant headquarters, success in the marketplace apparently depends on the local affiliates falling in line.

Alex Marland (Memorial University) has published about political marketing in the Journal of Public Affairs, political talk radio in Media, Culture and Society, and about Newfoundland nationalism in the International Journal of Canadian Studies. His research interests include political communications, electioneering, and politics in Canada and in Newfoundland.

At what stage of the product life cycle are Canada’s political parties?

Alex Marland (Memorial University) has published about political marketing in the Journal of Public Affairs, political talk radio in Media, Culture and Society, and about Newfoundland nationalism in the International Journal of Canadian Studies.

 

 

One of the many things that marketers look at when they assess a product or service is its stage in the product life cycle. Now, politics is not really a product, and a politician is a human being. Think of politics more as a service, where politicians are franchisees of a larger organization. In the past I have likened election candidates to realtors (i.e., real estate agents) who work under a major brand label that helps promote their services. However lately I have been thinking about what a Canadian party strategist recently told me: that politicians are more like dentists, because they provide a necessary service that causes some people distress.

There are four elements to the product life cycle: introduction, growth, maturity and decline. This traces a product from its development and launch through to gradual market acceptance. Then competition gets more challenging and demand for the product starts levelling off. Eventually the product fills a niche in the market, has to be re-launched, or expires altogether.

Using the product life cycle lens, what might we say about Canada’s federal political parties in 2011? Some context is provided below to help you arrive at your own observations.

CONSERVATIVE PARTY
The history of this party is full of incidences of passing through the product life cycle. It has changed its name multiple times, including being known as the Liberal-Conservatives, Unionist, the ‘National Liberal and Conservative Party’, Progressive Conservative, and, since 2004, Conservative. There have also been offshoots, most recently Reform and then the Canadian Alliance. In elections this party has experienced the highest of highs (Macdonald’s majorities, Diefenbaker in 1958, Mulroney in 1984) and the lowest of lows (winning just two seats in 1993). This is because it fractures apart and succeeds only when the Liberal party falters. Its market potential is limited when its emphasis is on right-of-centre voters and its potential grows when it seeks to reach median voters in the middle of the political spectrum.

The ‘new’ Conservative party was announced in late 2003 and was launched when Stephen Harper became its first leader in 2004. It has been going through a growth phase ever since and has been the market leader since 2006. The question about its life cycle is whether this political product has matured or not. If the Conservatives can achieve a majority government then the party will have continued to grow, notwithstanding various bumps in the road along the way. But it is difficult to imagine a governing party being satisfied with forming yet another minority government. If the Conservatives secure a third consecutive minority then an argument could be made that the party has levelled off and that a new approach, not just hypersegmentation, will be needed to avoid entering a period of product decline.

Key question: What is the market peak for the Conservatives?

LIBERAL PARTY
As any student of Canadian politics knows the Liberal party has enjoyed a prolonged life cycle. It barely existed at Confederation and its introduction and growth phase began with Wilfred Laurier. Throughout the 20th century the party was in a sustained maturity phase whereby it regularly won majority governments and has fared no worse than forming the official opposition, to the point that the Liberal party obtained the moniker ‘Natural Governing Party’. Though it experienced its own major hiccups, usually due to serious scandals, its brand is sufficiently strong that it has never really been in decline or had to be re-launched. Certainly there have been strategic changes in leadership and marketing methods (the 1960s and 1990s come to mind) but the Liberal party has enjoyed considerable success securing votes from the political centre. This ‘big tent’ party has yet to be humbled with the type of significant election loss that causes a complete product renewal, the sort that occurs when a party is mired in the depths of opposition and faces further losses without major and potentially risky change, the kind that party members vex about.

The Liberal party has gone through a number of product adjustments since 2003 and its results in recent elections, both percentage of the vote and seat count, suggest that this is a party that has matured and is in the decline phase. Once a party of stability, it has now had three leaders in five years, and the current one did not even receive members’ endorsement in a leadership convention. Marketers have tinkered with the Liberal brand mark (logo) and notwithstanding the 2008 green shift policy it isn’t abundantly clear what unique service is being offered or even what the compelling reasons are for choosing the Liberal product. The public input that the party received at its ‘thinkers’ conference’ in March 2010 is indicative that new leader Michael Ignatieff recognizes that the party cannot rely on its weakened brand and that it badly needs some redevelopment. Being a market challenger means needing to convince people that you offer a better product than the one that consumers are currently using. The Liberals need to provide compelling incentives to reassure electors that switching political products is worth the risk.

Key question: What does the Liberal party need to do to grow?

BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS
In political marketing the Bloc Québécois is one of the only instances that Canada ever gets mentioned internationally. This is because the Bloc is an excellent case of a niche product. It was introduced as a party that would only seek support in Quebec, it has not wavered in its core product of defending Quebec values (though those are subject to change including when support for separatism is in flux), and it has maintained a solid leadership presence with current leader Gilles Duceppe having also been the party’s first MP. This is a party that passed through the introduction and growth phases very quickly in the early 1990s and ever since has been nestled in the maturity phase with a reasonably consistent level of support. Its decline has often been prophesized but its ability to continue as a protest party has been remarkable... and is also an indication that none of the parties seeking to form the federal government have been able to offer a more competitive product in the Quebec electoral marketplace.

There is little reason to think that the Bloc Québécois won’t continue to maintain its niche product status in the near future. There is simply no indication that the federal parties will be able to displace it and convince Bloc supporters to give up on a product that, to some, has delivered value and is familiar. Its brand as the representative of Quebec values is very difficult to challenge particularly for non-Francophone party leaders. The other parties may not be able to encroach upon the Bloc’s niche market until its current leader retires and/or until they have their own leader who can communicate renewal within Quebec. The guessing game of when this party will disappear continues.

Key question: What will cause the Bloc Québécois to decline?

NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY
The roots of the New Democratic Party are in a niche product of democratic socialism. Going back to the 1933 Regina Manifesto and the creation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and the rebranding of that party into the NDP in 1961 through a formal alliance with organized labour, this party has apparently been satisfied with being Parliament’s so-called ‘moral conscience’. Unlike the Conservative party, it has been unwilling to grow its market share by adjusting its core product and appealing to the median voter. Thus it has occupied an unmoving status as a market follower: it has never even formed the official opposition in Ottawa.

Under leader Jack Layton the NDP has modernized and a case could be made that it has subtly experienced a mild re-launch. In the 2008 campaign the party adopted a number of mainstream approaches, including promoting their leader as a candidate for PM, and it occasionally touches on soft populist principles, such as ending taxes on home heating fuel, that have appeal beyond the political left. Talk of renaming the party is common and high level officials have mused about a merger with the Liberal party. There are at least two election outcomes that would move the NDP away from its current position as a pan-Canadian niche party. One is if it succeeds in convincing enough so-called “Layton Liberals” (i.e., median voters) to vote NDP that it challenges to form the official opposition (in such a case the party would be well advised to pull 'red Tories' away from the Conservatives and the Bloc). The other outcome is that it fares so poorly that the party membership, after much soul-searching, recognizes that it is time to engage in a major re-launch, something akin to Tony Blair’s ‘new Labour’ in the UK. This is a party that went through one product life cycle as the CCF and, notwithstanding recent seat gains, there are long-term signs that its current incarnation is in decline or else that it has settled into its commonly perceived niche role as a party that is unable to challenge the market leader.

Key question: What circumstances would be needed for the NDP to consider a product re-launch?

GREEN PARTY
The Green Party is what political science often dismisses as a ‘fringe’ party. That was certainly true a decade ago but under the new party financing regime that since 2004 has rewarded parties for obtaining votes, not necessarily seats, the Greens have professionalized considerably. They still have never elected an MP and even if they do they will not be able to break into the mainstream until they can shake their positioning as a party that for many electors appears to offer little more than a micro-niche product of environmentalism and a “none of the above” brand. As with the NDP, and unlike the Bloc Québécois, they are seriously disadvantaged by the electoral system which is a harsh reality of the electoral marketplace that they must adapt to.

A very rosy view of the Green Party is that it is in a growth phase. The presence of leader Elizabeth May in the 2008 election debates and the continued possibility that she may finally win a seat are examples that the party is growing. If it goes on to be reasonably successful (i.e., wins at least the 12 seats needed for party status in the House of Commons) then we would look back at 2011 and say that the Greens were in the introduction phase of the product life cycle. But a more realistic view is that the party needs to do more than just compete for votes primarily for financial reasons. If it doesn’t get a breakthrough soon we could consider it a mature product that has nestled into a role as a fringe outsider, albeit a well-financed one.

Key question: Is the Green party’s growth necessarily tied to the existence of party subsidies?